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1 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is not an immigration agreement,
but both the American and Mexican governments relied implicitly on the idea that the
stimulation of the Mexican economy could curb immigration to the United States. Yet
today the situation has not changed for the better, considering not only the increase in
immigration  since  the  mid-1990s,  but  also  its  large  share  of  unauthorized  border-
crossings. At the time the agreement was signed, in preparation for the expected short-
term increase in immigration, the United States launched several operations to try to
strengthen its  control  of  the border.  Yet even if  these operations have rendered the
border more difficult to cross, they have failed to produce the deterrent effect that had
been wished for. Indeed, the change brought by these actions has not been to reduce the
number  of  people  crossing  the  border,  but  to  decrease  the  number  of  temporary
migrations through which seasonal laborers returned to Mexico after the harvesting or
construction  season.  The  result  of this  new  immigration  pattern  has  been  a  sharp
increase in the number of unauthorized immigrants choosing to stay in the United States,
and therefore a  growth of  the undocumented population to  about  11  million people
(Passel and Cohn, 2010). 
2 This growth has only been matched by the increase in remittances sent from the United
States  to  Mexico  and Central  American countries.  The  amount  sent  in  2007  reached
26 billion  dollars  (MIF,  2009),  and  has  only  decreased  slightly  since  then.  As  more
migrants  find their  way to  the  U.S.  labor  market  and the  sending of  remittances  is
facilitated by the liberalization of trade between the two countries, we can observe the
development  of  a  parallel  ‘integrated’  region where “people  move north and money
moves south” (Suro, 2003: 5) and which shadows the regionalism planned by NAFTA. This
new region encompasses Mexico and the entire United States. If the goals of NAFTA in
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terms of immigration were not met, the liberalization of trade and the increase in travel
between the U.S. and Mexico has led to the development of a ‘shadow’ regional system
outside of the realm of competence of the agreement, but which in its own way brings
benefits to both partners. 
 
NAFTA and the U.S. – Mexico immigration system
Migrants as central agents of the regional system
3 The  regional  system  developed  in  parallel  with  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement  is  one  that  was  created  by  migrants  themselves,  through  their  own
movements and exchanges across the border. The literature on transnational studies has
increasingly  shown the positive  role  that  migrants  themselves  can play as  agents  of
transnational  development  (Faist,  2008;  Kapur,  2004).  The  economic  regionalism
promoted by NAFTA was designed and set up by states and other institutional actors.
Through the lens of transnationalism, it becomes possible to study the lives and actions of
migrants in the region, particularly those of unauthorized migrants, and to see these
experiences as the basis for a form of “shadow” regionalism that has emerged as an
unintended consequence of the trade agreement. According to Faist (2008),  states are
limited by their clear territorial  borders,  unlike markets and communities which can
develop across them. This “shadow” system also includes a darker aspect of the lives of
migrants - their exploitation by human traffickers, smugglers and organized crime. This
view allows us to consider a new migration and economic system encompassing Mexico
and the entire United States, from California through the mid-West to the South. 
4 The role of migrants is central in the establishment of a regional “system” parallel to the
economic  integration  of  NAFTA.  As  a  new  focus  for  transnational  studies,  migrant
practices  are  seen in  a  more  positive  light,  and  are  now understood not  just  as  an
experience in the host country, but also in relations to their home country (Levitt and
Jaworsky, 2007). This conception of a social space across borders, which is carried on by
migrants rather than states and institutions, is increasingly common in the literature, as
exemplified  by  Roger  Smith’s  Mexican  New  York (2006).  His  account  of  the  lives  and
experiences of Mexican migrants between New York and Mexico shows not only new
strategies  for  personal  economic  development  and  social  mobility,  but  also  the
transformation  of  each  social  and  geographical  space  migrants  access.  By  placing
migrants at the center of the creation of the new system, the transnational focus invites
us to look at their habits, their movements, their use of technology (Waldinger, 2007) and
at  their  financial  operations  across  borders.  According  to  Vertovec  (2004),  the  new
direction of the literature on transnational practices has made the transformation of
space  and  regions  a  greater  point  of  interest  than  local  change. The  use of  the
transnational lens allows us to focus on deep processes of transformation that are already
ongoing,  rather  than  focus  on  one  particular  locality.  Thus  the  establishment  of  a
“shadow” region can be understood as the transformation of institutions and practices by
migrants themselves, as they maintain transnational practices between the United States
and  Mexico.  It  is  those  practices,  and  particularly  unauthorized  migration  and
remittances, that we will use here to understand how the combination of the pre-existing
US-Mexico  migratory  system  and  the  effects  of  NAFTA  have  contributed  to  the
transformation of the region. 
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 The secondary goal of reducing immigration
5 NAFTA is a commercial treaty that covers the exchange of goods, services and capital
between the United States,  Mexico and Canada,  but unlike other regional integration
treaties - such as the Maastricht Treaty in Europe - it does not mention the movement of
persons within that region. Yet it was thought to bring some benefits in areas beyond the
economic and financial  spheres.  More specifically,  one common assumption was that
increasing trade flows between the United States and Mexico would eventually reduce
immigration from the latter to the former. According to Gustavo Flores-Macías (2008:
436), those who drafted the treaty relied on a ‘classical international trade theory’ in
which the increase in trade flows would reduce the number of immigrant workers coming
from Mexico. The idea was that Mexico would concentrate on developing labor-intensive
productions, and that greater investment from the United States and Canada would lead
to job creation and increase in wages, thus reducing the need to migrate north for labor
and higher wages. This view corresponds to that of economists who see migration as an
investment decision,  for which the migrant weighs the benefits and costs of moving,
whether legally or not (Greenwood, 1985; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999). If in the short
run the liberalization of exchanges was expected to increase immigration, in the long
run, the trade agreement was supposed to reduce the wage differential between Mexico
and its northern neighbors, and thus eliminate emigration as a suitable alternative for
Mexican workers. 
6 There  were  several  obstacles  to  the  implementation  of  this  theory.  First  of  all,  the
Mexican administration had hoped to emulate the development of other international
partnerships,  such  as  the  emerging  ‘Asian  Tigers’  and  the  European  Union,  whose
situation did not match that of North America. However, as Fernández-Kelly and Massey
noted, the growth of the Asian Tigers relied on strong action taken by the government,
and not on ‘the weakening of the state [and] laissez faire economics’ (2007: 104) which
were brought on by NAFTA. As far as Europe was concerned, the Salinas administration
was particularly interested in the example of  Spain,  which had recently witnessed a
tremendous growth. Yet the Mexican and U.S. governments neglected to include in the
agreement the same precautions that had been taken by the European Union. Indeed,
well before the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, important investments had been made into the
weaker economies of the Union such as Spain and Portugal, notably to avoid a predictable
‘rush’ of workers from poorer to richer nations once the borders were open (Uchitelle,
2007).  In this perspective,  the European Union introduced the concept of “concentric
circles” (Domenach, 2001: 57) based on each country’s level of closeness to the Union and
its economic ties with it. Domenach noted that the establishment of such a system would
increase human mobility within this new transnational space. Without these precautions,
or  the acknowledgment  of  an old migratory system between Mexico and the United
States, the long-term immigration benefits brought by NAFTA were very unlikely. 
7 Another assumption of the agreement that proved inaccurate was that emigration from
Mexico was more closely related to the Mexican economy than to the U.S. economy, and
thus  that  the  stimulation  of  the  Mexican  economy  would  decrease  emigration.  Yet
according to a Pew Hispanic Center analysis of immigration to the U.S. between 1992 and
2004, it seems that the Mexican immigration was primarily influenced by changes in the
U.S. economy. By looking at the U.S. job expansion and Mexican migration over the same
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period, Passel and Suro state that ‘the annual flow of migrants from Mexico […] appears
to be more closely correlated to macrotrends in the U.S economy than in the Mexican
economy’ (Passel and Suro, 2005: 11). As evidence of the flawed assumption we can look at
the wage differential between Mexico and the United States, which the agreement was
supposed to reduce. On the one hand, the agreement did increase the amount of foreign
direct investment (FDI) to Mexico, which tripled between 1994 and 2007 (Flores-Macías,
2008). These investments were supposed to support labor-intensive production in Mexico
and create more jobs, thus increasing wages in the country. Yet the wage differential
between Mexico and its American neighbor ‘widened by 7 percent’ over the same period
of time (2008: 437), which maintained the attractiveness of the U.S. labor market. Others,
such as Acevedo and Espenshade (1992), had already pointed out in the early 1990s that
the transfer of jobs from the United States to Mexico would not reduce migration because
the wage differential would remain large enough, thus encouraging potential migrants to
choose international migration to the United States rather than internal migration within
Mexico.  Therefore,  the  assumptions  that  were  made at  the  time underestimated the
economic situation in the region, and doomed the immigration expectations of all the
parties involved.
 
The militarization of the border with Mexico
8 The  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  coincided  with  a  tightening  and
militarization of the border with Mexico. In fact, over the 1990s, state reforms and media
coverage contributed to shift the public’s perception of the border from a labor issue to a
national  security  issue.  States  like  California  made  headlines  by  adopting  hardline
policies such as Proposition 187 (1994), which prevented undocumented immigrants from
using  public  services,  or  Proposition  227  (1998)  which  severely  limited  bilingual
education. The common assumption then was that immigration was increasing sharply
and that the United States needed to defend its borders and its culture. Several steps were
taken to reassure the public that the government would take care of immigration, and
particularly  unauthorized  immigration.  Thus,  as  Andreas  noted,  there  became  an
‘apparent  paradox  of  U.S.-Mexico  integration  [in  which]  a  barricaded  border  and  a
borderless economy [were] being created simultaneously’ (1999: 593). 
9 Several pieces of legislation were adopted during the 1990s that tightened the border and
made life  more  difficult  for  all  migrants,  whether  lawfully  admitted or  not.  In  1996
Congress  adopted  three  laws  related  to  unauthorized  migration.  The  first  was  the
Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act,  signed  in  April  and  intended  to  deter
terrorism. The act suspended certain provisions of Habeas Corpus in cases related to
terrorism, and also limited the power of federal judges in such cases. Law enforcement
officers  were  authorized  to  detain  immigrants  suspected  of  terrorism  for  an
indeterminate length of  time,  and deferred indefinitely the presentation of  whatever
proof the police had against a particular suspect. In August, Congress passed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which limited federal assistance to migrants, even
those who had been lawfully admitted to the United States.  The new law stated that
migrants could not benefit from federal aid for the first five years of their stay in the
United States. Then in September, Congress adopted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act. This law allowed the increase in the number of Border Patrol
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agents by 5,000 before 2001, as well as the construction of a fence on the border south of
San Diego (Andreas, 1999). 
10 Several steps were thus taken simultaneously. The Clinton administration reinforced the
Border Patrol in an effort to counter Republican criticism that Democrats were too ‘soft’
on immigration. The budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service – nowadays
part of the Department of Homeland Security – was tripled between 1993 and 1999 to
reach $4.2 billion (Andreas, 1999: 594). The number of agents hired to guard the border
between the U.S. and Mexico increased by 83 % between 1993 and 1997, and new high-
tech material such as “infrared night-vision scopes, low-light TV cameras, [and] ground
sensors” (ibid, p.595) were given to the agency. The military became more involved on the
border as well. Reservists and army engineers were used to build walls and fences along
the border. Army equipment such as body sensors, which Andreas notes were originally
used in Vietnam, started being used along the line of separation to detect any trespassers.
Thus, security agencies whose original goal was to “deter military threats” (ibid, p. 592)
were being used to deter unauthorized migration from Mexico and countries in Central
America. It seemed that the government of the United States was trying to match the
public’s change of perception of immigration from a labor issue to a security issue by
treating unauthorized migrants as they would any other force threatening their integrity
and sovereignty.  For  example,  the  United  States  deployed its  national  guard  on the
border with Mexico. Its departure from the region, which had been planned for June of
2011 (Kelly and Wagner,  2011)  was recently postponed by the Obama Administration
(Dinan, 2011). 
11 Thus, while NAFTA was being implemented, the tightening of the border on the U.S. side
contrasted sharply with the expectation of increased trade flows. Yet for many reasons,
these measures  were insufficient  to deter  an even greater  number of  migrants  from
coming to the U. S. in the decade after NAFTA went into force. 
 
The increase in Mexican immigration
12 Following the adoption of NAFTA, immigration from Mexico soared throughout the 1990s
and  early  2000s.  At  the  time,  this  was  understood  to  be  a  short-term effect  of  the
implementation of the agreement. In 1990, the Commission for the Study of International
Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (CSIMCED) published a report on the
likely effects of a free-trade agreement with Mexico. The Commission noted that in the
short term the economic development of the Mexican economy would lead to an increase
in  immigration.  However,  those  who predicted  a  long-term decrease  in  immigration
failed to anticipate the importance of the U.S. pull factors for unemployed or displaced
Mexican workers. Mexican migration is indeed driven by both pull factors from the U.S.
labor market (better wages, living standard, the ability to send money home), and push 
factors in Mexico (economic crisis, worker displacement, violence). In this case, it was
assumed that by dealing with the push factors,  immigration could be reduced,  which
proved not to be the case. However, it is true that a short-term increase in migration was
expected  by  those  who  signed  the  agreement.  But  several  elements  contributed  to
exacerbate and prolong the effects of this increase. 
13 First of all, Mexico experienced a crisis at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 that
increased the number of potential migrants. This crisis was both financial and political.
During  the  1994  presidential  campaign,  the  assassination  of  Luis  Donaldo  Colosio,  a
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candidate  from  the  ruling  PRI,  sent  a  negative  message  to  potential  investors  who
repatriated their capital.  Indeed, investors feared a change in governmental decisions
away from the policies of the PRI, which had been behind the neoliberal orientation of
Mexico. After the peso was devalued by 120 %, inflation surged from 7 to 52 % in 1995 and
investors lost confidence in the country. According to Gustavo Flores-Macías, “that year
Mexico’s economy shrank by 6.2 percent in real terms” (2008: 437). This series of events
contributed to an increase in the number of people attempting to cross the border into
the United States. In the early and mid-1990s, the average level of immigration to the
United States was about 1 million people a year,  but from 1995 to 1997 that number
increased to 1.2 million per year (Passel and Suro, 2005).  This predictable short-term
migration increase did not level until off after a few years. Immigration to the U.S. peaked
between 1999 and 2000 to reach “at least 1.5 million per year […] which may understate
the inflows of immigrants, since about 1.8 million arrived in 1999 according to data from
Census 2000” (ibid, 3). The share of Mexicans in this cohort was stable at about a third of
the total inflow, with roughly 500,000 Mexican migrants crossing the border during the
peak years  of  1999  and 2000.  Thus,  the  first  years  of  the  implementation of  NAFTA
actually coincided with a sharp increase in Mexican immigration to the United States. 
14 Another factor to take into account is the attractiveness of the U.S. labor market for
displaced Mexican workers. Before NAFTA was implemented, Mexico’s collective farms
were  privatized  and  agricultural  subsidies  were  largely  eliminated,  resulting  in  an
increase  in  the  number  of  peasants  seeking  opportunities  north  of  the  border.
Meanwhile, the U.S. labor market expanded in the 1990s, especially in the peak migration
years of 1999 and 2000.  After the 1991 recession,  the labor market increased by 1.59
million in 1993, and then by 1.85 million in 1998 (Passel and Suro, 2005: 10). This labor
market was particularly welcoming to cheap Mexican labor. Passel and Suro note that in
2000, “both the U.S. expansion and the growth of Mexican migration reached a peak” (ibid
).  There is therefore a very strong interdependence between the labor market in the
United States and Mexican migrant labor. In fact, despite the political talk of controlling
unauthorized immigration, Congress and various administrations have failed to actually
adopt a law that would effectively curb the employment of undocumented workers. In
1996, only 2 percent of the budget of the INS was dedicated to investigating employers
and sanctioning those who employed undocumented migrants (Andreas, 1999). According
to Peter Andreas, the United States “ranks among the lowest [industrialized countries] in
terms of sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants” (ibid, p. 603). There seems to
be a contradiction between the displayed intent of the U.S. to control undocumented
immigration on the one hand and, on the other, the economic interest of the nation in
letting in cheap Mexican labor to support the economy. 
15 Emigration from south of the border soared in the 1990s, while the U.S. administration
attempted to seal its border against trespassers. This has paradoxically led to an increase
in the number of undocumented people living in the United States, as the perspective of
getting caught during seasonal migrations has convinced some migrants that it was safer
to simply stay in the country for  good.  This  trend has had serious consequences on
immigration patterns as well as on the lives of new receiving states in the United States. 
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The Growth of the Undocumented Population in the
United States.
A riskier, deadlier border
16 As we have seen, the tightening of the border with Mexico has not stopped people from
immigrating to the United States. But it has in fact had one major consequence on their
immigration choices: more and more unauthorized migrants are choosing to stay in the
United States to avoid getting caught at the border (Cornelius, 2004). Until the mid-1990s,
it was common for seasonal workers to cross the border when their labor was needed,
and to go back to Mexico once the season was over (Espenshade, 1994). Lindstrom (1996)
provides a thorough review of the literature on the “temporary nature of current and
past migration to the United States” (1996: 357). The number of apprehensions at the
border reflects this trend, as shown in a Pew Hispanic Report from 2007: “The highest
numbers of apprehensions are recorded from February to March as migrants move north
for the construction and harvesting seasons” (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007: 12). This also
shows once again the strong relationship between Mexican migration and the needs of
the  U.S.  labor  market.  Yet,  because  of  the  strong  stance  taken  by  the  American
government  and  the  changes  made  along  the  border,  these  seasonal  crossings  have
become  riskier.  This  effect  had  already  been  felt  after  the  implementation  of  the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which allowed for the granting of temporary
status to undocumented workers who had arrived in the United States before January 1st,
1982, while  introducing  tougher  sanctions  on  those  who  employed  undocumented
workers. However, the law did not translate into actual enforcement and oversight of
workers’ status. In fact, Roger Daniels noted on the subject that this law “may have had
the paradoxical effect of keeping more Mexican illegals in the United States than it kept
out, as many […] were now afraid that they would not be able to return” (2002: 397). The
new sanctions  introduced  in  the  mid-1990s  had  similar  consequences,  which  helped
sustain the development of a new regional system. 
17 There are two main risks encountered by those who decide to cross the border into the
United  States  illegally.  First  of  all,  as  we  have  seen,  the  surge  in  technology  and
manpower along the border has led to an increase in the number of apprehensions. The
Border Patrol reported “a high of 1.8 million” caught in 2000, with the vast majority of
them – over 85% - Mexican nationals (Wu, 2006: 1). Of course, part of these 1.8 million is
actually  made  up  of  single  individuals  being  arrested  several  times.  A  report  from
Homeland Security showed that,  as the U.S.  economy declined, so did the number of
apprehensions on the border (Rytina and Simanski, 2009). They also stated that a possible
reason for the decrease in apprehensions was the “enhanced border enforcement efforts”
(ibid, p.1). Another consequence of the tightening of the border is the increase in deaths
in the region due to the more dangerous routes taken by unauthorized migrants. Because
regular ports of entry such as the south of San Diego have been sealed off and walls have
been built, the flow of migrants has moved eastward to areas that are more difficult to
cross on foot,  such as the Sonora Desert  in Arizona.  A recent report  from the ACLU
estimated that the number of deaths on the border since the beginning of “Operation
Gatekeeper” ranged between 3,861 and 5,607 (Jimenez, 2009). 
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18 All these factors have contributed to the growth of the undocumented population in the
United States. While the number of legal permanent residents in the country actually
decreased in the 1990s, the number of unauthorized migrants grew sharply. According to
the Pew Hispanic Center, undocumented migrants “represented fewer than four in ten
new immigrants before the peak [of 1999-2000] and almost five in ten afterwards” (2005:
5). This growth of the undocumented population did not slow down for a few years. Passel
noted in 2005 that the annual average growth of this group between 2000 and 2004 had
been  “about  485,000  per  year”  (2005:  2).  The  share  of  Mexican  nationals  in  the
undocumented population remained stable over the 1990s and early 2000s, at about 60 %
(compared  to  a  third  only  for  all  immigrants).  Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  the
implementation of NAFTA, most of the immigration from Mexico was unauthorized and
largely contributed to the growth of the undocumented population living in the United
States.  However,  the  number  of  undocumented immigrants  in  the  United States  has
decreased over the last few years, from an estimated 12 million people in March 2007 to
11.1  million in March 2009 (Passel  and Cohn,  2010),  even if  the size  of  the Mexican
undocumented population has remained fairly stable at 7 million individuals since 2007. 
 
The predominance of Mexicans among the undocumented
19 As noted before, Mexicans represent over half of the undocumented population residing
in the United States. This fact shows that the assumed benefits of NAFTA were unable to
counter a trend that started decades ago and which has led to a surge of the share of
Mexican unauthorized immigration compared to the share of legal migration. As Nicholas
de Genova puts it: 
Mexican migration to the U.S. is distinguished by a seeming paradox that is seldom
examined: while no other country has supplied nearly as many migrants to the U.S.
as Mexico has since 1965, virtually all major changes in U.S. immigration law during
this period have created ever more severe restrictions on the conditions of “legal”
migration from Mexico. (2006: 61)
20 Mexican migrants were in fact an essential part of the development of the Southwest of
the United States, and before World War II they were encouraged to migrate north to
work in the agricultural sector. De Genova notes in particular that the introduction of
numerical quotas in 1924 left out the entire Western Hemisphere, and Mexico with it. The
first  form  of  control  came  during  the  Great  Depression,  when  about  half  a  million
Mexican  migrants  were  “repatriated”  to  Mexico.  During  the  war,  both  governments
initiated the Bracero Program, providing cheap labor for U.S. agriculture and railroad
construction. Yet, the program not only encouraged the trend of Mexican labor crossing
the border, it also enabled even more undocumented migrants to come to the United
States “through the development of a migration infrastructure and through employers’
encouragement of braceros to overstay the limited tenure of their contracts” (ibid, 66).
The official end of the program did not decrease the need for this type of labor, and
immigration continued outside of any form of official program. 
21 The 1965  immigration law established for  the  first  time  a  numerical  quota  on legal
migration from the Western Hemisphere,  and later amendments only diminished the
number  of  people  allowed  to  emigrate  each  year  from  Latin  America.  This  was
particularly  detrimental  to  Mexicans,  who  had  been  the  most  numerous  group
immigrating to the U.S., but who were given the same number of “legal entries” as other
countries,  slightly  under  20,000  a  year.  De  Genova  thus  shows  that  even  if  151,000
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Mexicans were already being deported each year at the time the law was adopted, the law
only authorized 120,000 legal entries from the entire Western Hemisphere (ibid, 71). In
1976, a revision of the law gave each country of the hemisphere 20,000 legal migrants,
while that same year the number of apprehensions of Mexicans on the border reached
781,000. Thus, the gap between the reality of Mexican migration and the U.S. legislation
has been consistently unfavorable towards Mexican legal migration. Most of the recent
changes in U.S.  immigration policies seem to have created a scenario where Mexican
migrants  have no choice but  to migrate illegally.  Relocating legally  to the U.S.  from
Mexico can take years,  but  it  can also  never  happen if  admission is  simply refused.
Espenshade (1994) points out that the first Mexicans granted residency under the third
preference category in March 1994 had had their applications approved in 1985.  The
author explains that the rewards of immigrating illegally in terms of job opportunities
and connections with family often outweigh the perceived benefits of waiting years for a
visa.  The  combination of  a  strong migrant  network  in  place  for  decades  and of  job
opportunities, associated with the near-impossibility of immigrating legally to the United
States, have contributed to the growth of the undocumented population from Mexico. 
22 Mexicans represent today the largest number of unauthorized and legal migrants in the
United States,  with each group numbering respectively 7 and 5.7 million people (Pew
Hispanic Center, 2009). This report notes that Mexicans represent 32 % of all foreign-born
living in the country. Even if this figure is used by many politicians to show the lack of
federal control over immigration, the authors of the report remind us that this kind of
concentration  is  indeed  very  high,  but  not  unheard  of.  In  fact,  Irish  immigrants
“represented a third or more of the immigrant population from 1850 to 1870 […] and
Germans were 26 % to 30 % of the foreign-born population from 1850 to 1900” (2009: 2).
Thus the high concentration of Mexicans in the United States, as well as the unauthorized
nature of their migration pattern, could be seen as a repetition of a well-known trend in a
country so often defined as a “nation of immigrants.” What is different today is that the
United  States  is  no  longer  transformed  by  a  westward  expansion  but  by  a  new
immigration driven by the south that redefines the social and economic relationships in
the entire region.
 
New immigration states
23 Since  the  mid-1990s,  the  share  of  unauthorized  immigrants  among  Mexicans  has
increased compared to legal arrivals. These recent, undocumented migrants vary greatly
from former immigrants in several aspects that all impact the region where they settle.
First, Mexican migrants in general tend to be younger than other immigrants or than the
U.S. population. Secondly, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, they “have lower levels
of  education,  lower  incomes,  larger  households  and higher  poverty rates  than other
groups”  (2009:  3).  These  characteristics  are  greatly  magnified  when one  looks  more
specifically at undocumented immigrants. This particular group is also younger, with less
than 10 % of them over the age of 40, and one in six being under the age of 18 (Passel,
2005: 1). Unauthorized migrants are also much more likely to have even less education
than other migrants, and to speak English less than well. 
24 All these factors affect the states where undocumented immigrants settle. Among these
are traditional immigration states such as California or New York, which have long had a
large foreign-born population, and where these immigrants benefit from strong networks
Broken Promises? NAFTA, Immigration, and ‘Shadow’ Regionalism
IdeAs, 1 | 2011
9
that provide assistance. But over the last decade, new immigration states have emerged
that are not familiar with immigrant populations and where the relationship between
migrants and state governments is much more confrontational. The most recent report
from the 2010 Census indicates that the Hispanic population grew most significantly in
the South and the West of the United States between 2000 and 2010 (Ennis et al., 2011).
The Hispanic population in the South and the Midwest grew respectively by 57 percent
and 49 percent (ibid, p. 4). These new states include Arizona, Nevada, Utah, North and
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Oklahoma  and  Tennessee.  The  new
immigration pattern for  undocumented migrants  has  led to  a  rapid diffusion of  this
population over the South and Southeast of the United States, with less concentration in
traditional  immigration  states.  Passel  noted  that  “by  2004,  an  estimated  3.9 million
undocumented migrants lived outside of those traditional settlement states,” compared
to only 400,000 in 1990 (2005: 3). In these new immigration states, the undocumented
population makes up to 40 % of the total foreign-born population. 
25 As we have seen, these new immigration states are not as used to large foreign-born
populations as traditional settlement states, and most of the time they do not provide
specific  services like translators  or  bilingual  education at  school.  They are,  however,
more dynamic economically and thus attract a large new population that is not limited to
Hispanic  migrants,  but  that  also  includes  black  and  white  nationals.  The  Hispanic
population in these states has experienced a tremendous growth between 2000 and 2010:
that  of  North  Carolina  has  increased  by  111 percent,  that  of  South  Carolina  by
147 percent, that of Alabama by 144 percent, and that of Arkansas by 114 percent (Census
Data  2010).  This  growth has  had  a  serious  impact  on the  infrastructure  of  the  new
receiving  states,  and  particularly  on  public  services.  This  new  pressure  has  led  a
significant portion of the population of these states to support legislators who advocate
the restriction of access to services such as health care, housing and education. This had
been the case in the past in California with the 1994 “Save Our State” Initiative, and more
recently in new immigration states such as Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina.
26 Examples of this type of reaction targeting more specifically undocumented immigrants
are  given  by  Cortez  (2008),  who  cites  initiatives  taken  by  local  governments  in
Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  in  2006.  In  July  of  that  year,  the  town  of  Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, prohibiting business from
hiring unauthorized immigrants and fining landlords 1,000 dollars for renting to them (
ibid,  p. 58).  The ban was eventually judged unconstitutional  in federal  court.  Another
example made headlines when, in the spring of 2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070,
which states that “A law enforcement officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person if
the  officer  has  probable  cause  to  believe  that  the  person has  committed any public
offense that makes the person removable from the United States.” The text of the law
failed to specify what could constitute such “probable cause.” The number of state laws
related to immigration issues has exploded over the last few years. A recent report from
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) noted that whereas in 2005 there
had been 300 bills introduced on this topic and 38 laws enacted, in 2010 there were more
than  1,400 bills  introduced  and  208  laws  enacted,  with  an  additional  138 resolutions
(Johnston and Morse, 2011). The multiplication of state activity regarding immigrants and
their rights shows that these states are faced with a new situation for which they were
unprepared. 
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27 New immigration states often seem to respond negatively to an increase in their foreign-
born population because of the impact of this population on an infrastructure that is not
ready to accommodate them. This response often translates into state laws affecting the
lives of immigrants, while older immigration states tend do so through local initiatives, as
was  the  case  in  Pennsylvania  or  more  recently  in  California.  Thus,  we  can  see  the
development of a new regional system driven by a region stretching from the west coast
of the U.S. to the mountain states and the old south where an increase in the immigrant
population, and particularly in its undocumented share originating from Mexico, has led
legislatures to take action. These new immigration states reinforce the existence of the
entire system encompassing Mexico and the U.S., where people move north in search of
work and send money south to their countries of origin. 
 
A Parallel ‘Integrated Region’ Outside NAFTA
The role of remittances
28 Over the last fifteen years, there has been an important increase in the amount of money
transferred  from  the  United  States  to  Mexico  and  other  countries  in  the  form  of
remittances. In 2003, a joint report from the Pew Hispanic Center and the Multilateral
Investment Fund stated that “the total remittance flow from the United States to Latin
America and the Caribbean [came] close to $30 billion” (Suro, 2003: 3). The amount sent to
Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua had totaled 10.2 billion dollars
in 2000, and was expected to reach 14.2 billion in 2002 and 18 billion in 2005. The figure
for Mexico alone was $23 billion in 2006 (Waldinger, 2007: 9), and $26 billion in 2007. The
flow of remittances slowed down only in 2009, due to the financial crisis. However, for
2009, the amount of remittances sent to Mexico was over $21 billion (MIF, 2009), by far
the largest  amount received in Latin America.  Remittance senders  are mostly recent
immigrants and thus their characteristics match those of unauthorized migrants from
Mexico: they usually have little education, earn low incomes and do not speak English
well, which hinders their knowledge of the U.S. banking system. The vast majority of
remittance senders originate from poor workers. Receivers, on the contrary, are a varied
group, especially in Mexico. 18 % of the adult population receives remittances, which are
sent to “all sectors of Mexican society and to virtually every region” (Suro, 2003: 4). Most
other  receiving  countries  in  Central  America  show  a  concentration  of  remittance
receivers in the poorer categories of the population. 
29 Remittances play a part in this parallel integration of the region, not only because they
represent a transfer of money from the north to the south, but because they encourage
immigration  among  those  who  receive  them.  According  to  Gustavo  Flores-Macías,
remittances strengthen the bonds between sending and receiving communities, and thus
“perpetuate the social expectation […] of migrating north in order to achieve a better
living standard” (2008: 438). The ability to provide assistance to people who have stayed
in the country of origin also plays a part in this pattern. Thus remittances are not just a
consequence of immigration, but are also a motivation for immigration. The Pew Hispanic
Center report takes the example of Ecuador, where remittances are used primarily to
respond to a crisis. According to the authors, “the ability to establish a monetary flow
from abroad quickly and of sufficient size to ensure a family’s economic survival is now a
ready means of dealing with economic, political and environmental crises” (Suro, 2003:
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13). In the case of Mexico, where remittances are sent to all socio-economic groups in
society, remittance receivers are more likely than others to consider immigration in their
future. Therefore, remittances are an essential part of the ‘shadow’ integration of the
region: they not only provide the flow of money from the north to the south, but they
also encourage and finance the movement of people from the south to the north. 
30 The case of Mexico and the implications of remittances for immigration control are of
particular importance. As we have seen before, most official agreements between the
United States and Mexico, including NAFTA, aim to reduce immigration on the long term.
In the case of NAFTA, this indirect goal was supposed to be achieved through an increase
in wages, and therefore targeted those from the lower socio-economic levels of Mexican
society. Yet as we have also seen, remittances are sent to a larger segment of the Mexican
population than in other countries, and have little to do with income and educational
attainment. Therefore any immigration plan that solely aims at improving the lives of the
poorest in the nation would only have a limited impact. According to the Pew Hispanic
Center, “programs that aim at diminishing migration pressures […] will have to be as
broad-based as the remittance flow” (Suro, 2003: 9). The goals set up by NAFTA therefore
appear too limited to truly slow down the immigration flow originating from Mexico. The
characteristics of remittance senders and receivers in this country are too close to those
of the general population for the limited impact of a trade agreement to have any lasting
effect on immigration. Remittances do help the receiving countries, especially when they
are used to develop personal businesses and other investment, but they do not prevent
immigration. 
 
The darker side of the system
31 In  some  ways,  these  new  flows  of  people  and  money  have  benefitted  less  the
administrations that tried to organize the economic integration of the region through
NAFTA  than  ‘shadow’  organizations  that  have  developed  around  unauthorized
immigration and the exploitation of migrants and their families. These groups include
not only the financial institutions that transfer remittances, but also human traffickers,
smugglers, coyotes, organized crime, drug cartels and those specializing in the production
of fraudulent documents, all of whom have flourished since the tightening of the border
between the U.S.  and Mexico.  Because the border is  now so difficult  to cross,  it  has
become more  common for  potential  unauthorized immigrants  to  use  the  services  of
coyotes.  They,  in  turn,  have  increased  their  fees  due  to  the  conjunction  of  a  higher
demand and of a higher risk. Peter Andreas noted in 1999 that transportation fees had
doubled from $250 to at least $500 (1999: 599). The specialization of law enforcement
technologies has led smugglers to mirror the actions of the government. Andreas writes
that higher fees have enriched “increasingly sophisticated and well-organized binational
smuggling groups” (1999: 600). Thus, a parallel economy has developed along the border
with the sole purpose of providing people with access to the United States. This economy
includes services such as transportation,  border crossing,  and more specific products
such as fraudulent documents. Law enforcement agencies have not been able to prevent
the  rapid  outflow of  people  from Mexico,  and  seem to  have  actually  promoted  the
development of a ‘shadow’ economy devoted to unauthorized immigration.
32 In addition, the relationship between the United States and Mexico has suffered from the
ongoing violence brought on by drug cartels throughout Mexico as well as by the harsh
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response  to  these  groups  by  the  government.  Once  again,  this  aspect  of  the  system
involves flows of money from the United States to Mexico,  to which we can add the
transportation and sale of weapons. A 2000 report prepared for the Office of National
Drug Control Policy indicated that Americans spent $65 billion annually on illicit drugs
such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, most of which are, according to Tim Padgett,
“either produced in Mexico or transit trough it” (2011: 19).  In addition to drugs, law
enforcement agencies in the United States have recently made headlines in the revelation
of “Operation Fast and Furious” (Serrano, 2011), through which the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) allowed for the sale of guns in the hope that they
would later be traced to drug cartel leaders. Unfortunately, some of the guns were lost
and only recovered at crime scenes in Mexico as well as in the United States. This darker
aspect of  the transnational  space which is  emerging between Mexico and the United
States,  through  the  actions  of  both  migrants  and  governments,  threatens  American
security and economic interests (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011), and is in direct
contradiction with the institutional  security partnership established between the two
countries. Indeed, in 2005 the U.S. and Mexico, along with Canada, signed the Security
and  Prosperity  Partnership  of  North  America,  which  not  only  promoted  economic
cooperation  between the  three  countries,  but  also  intended to  protect  them against
common risks they faced. These risks were not limited to terrorist threats and natural
disasters, but also included dangers faced by transportation and energy infrastructures
on the  entire  continent.  The increase  in  violence  and criminal  activities  around the
border with Mexico today shows the limits of this partnership. 
 
A new ‘integrated region’
33 Through the intensification of two types of flows, people and money, a parallel form of
regionalism has emerged, encompassing Mexico and the South and Midwest of the United
States.  This system is likely to stay in place and flourish since both immigration and
remittances have accelerated in the last fifteen years. Moreover, as immigration provides
for more remittances, the latter encourages people to stay longer in their new area of
settlement. In countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras, more than half the
adult population has a relative abroad that has been sending them money for over five
years (Suro, 2003: 15). Thus, researchers from the Pew Hispanic Center talk about the
“staying power” of remittances, as families and nations depend on this influx of money
from abroad (ibid.: 15). 
34 As people move north and stay longer, new forms of communications are developed to
stay in touch with their country of origin. Remittances are of course one of these forms of
contact, but so are emails, phone calls, and actual travel (Suro, 2005; Waldinger, 2007).
Yet there seems to be an oppositional relationship between travel and remittances. On
the one hand, most of the money transferred abroad is sent by recent immigrants, and
the share of immigrants sending money home decreases with their length of stay in the
United States. On the other hand, recent migrants “account for most of the immigrants
who have never traveled back or have not done so recently” (Waldinger, 2007: 5). The key
element in this opposition is citizenship. Immigrants who have been in the United States
longer are more likely to have naturalized as American citizens, which can facilitate their
travel. On the contrary, those who arrived within the last ten years are more likely to
have come illegally. This is especially true of Mexican immigrants, about half of whom are
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currently undocumented. Thus, the acquisition of citizenship appears to be important in
order to maintain direct contact with home countries, but it does not prevent people
from sending money abroad. The regional system that develops is therefore not one that
requires a common identity,  but that is  mostly based on economic and demographic
characteristics. 
35 This shadow regionalism is acknowledged by the main actors on both sides of the border.
In  the  United  States,  more  and  more  efforts  are  made  to  capture  the  ever-growing
remittance market. Banks are trying to reach out to millions of potential customers who
are not familiar with the U.S. system. Some of them have started accepting ‘matriculas’-
Mexican identity cards delivered by Mexican consulates and showing the individual’s U.S.
address  –  as  the  necessary  paperwork  to  open  a  bank  account.  This  is  particularly
important for unauthorized immigrants who would otherwise be precluded from opening
an  account  from  where  to  send  money  abroad.  Due  to  efforts  from  the  Mexican
government to improve its consular services in the U.S., matriculas were in 2002 accepted
by 66 banks, hundreds of police departments, and could be used in 13 states to acquire a
drivers’ license (Suro et al., 2002: 15). The Pew Hispanic Center also noted the efforts of
Latino groups to provide financial literacy training to recent immigrants, thus improving
both their knowledge of American society and the standard of living of their relatives
abroad. The current competition to enter this new market and control it shows that the
remittance market, and the ‘shadow’ regionalism from which it has emerged, is widely
accepted as a fact of American economic life. An example of this is the 2009 ad campaign
run by Walmart to promote its Money Center,  where services like check cashing and
international  transfers  are  now  provided.  The  ads  prominently  featured  Latino
individuals and families. The remittance market and its customers have now become a
fixture of the U.S. economy, one that is likely to strengthen the bond between the United
States and Mexico in the future through deeper economic and social interdependence
across the border. 
 
Conclusion
36 NAFTA has brought some economic gains to the United States and Mexico -admittedly
unevenly distributed - even though their economic partnership now ranks behind the
relationship between the United States and China. The liberalization of trade between the
two countries has, however, helped the acceleration of the amount of remittances sent to
Mexico, which only started slowing down in 2008. Nevertheless, the 25 billion dollars sent
that  year  represented  the  second-largest  source  of  income  for  that  country.  The
economic gains of receiving countries from remittances is undeniable, but some also look
at their role in encouraging unauthorized immigration as a benefit for the United States
too.  The  slow  evolution  of  federal  immigration  law  concerning  the  employment  of
undocumented workers has done little to curb the American labor market’s appetite for
this type of labor, and we echo Douglas Massey in viewing both the economic and the
immigration policies  of  the United States  as  two policies  “moving in a  diametrically
opposed direction” (Massey, 2003: 2). In this perspective, the development of a region
where remittances sent  from the United States  by recent  immigrants  encourage and
finance the arrival of more Mexican labor can be seen as a parallel form of integration,
not explicitly planned by NAFTA, but in other ways beneficial to both partner countries. 
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ABSTRACTS
The reduction of immigration was never an official objective of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Yet, it was generally supposed to be one of its long-term consequences. Fifteen years
later, Mexican immigration to the United States has in fact increased. The agreement has failed
to  reduce  the  attractiveness  of  the  U.S.  labor  market  for  Mexican  workers  and  to  provide
sustainable alternatives to immigration. Over the same period of time, American politicians and
the American media have consistently embraced a narrative in which immigration control has
become a matter of national security. A paradox has emerged from these two conflicting trends.
While  the  measures  taken  by  the  federal  government  have  failed  to  prevent  unauthorized
migrants from entering the country, they have also encouraged them to stay longer in the U.S. by
making border-crossings too risky. The 1990s therefore witnessed a significant growth of the
undocumented population of the United States. 
This paper analyzes the emergence of a “shadow” regional system between Mexico and the U.S.,
driven by immigrants themselves, as well as those who profit from undocumented immigration,
rather than by institutional actors. This shadow integration is the product of two types of flows:
people moving north of the border and, increasingly, remittances moving south. Remittances in
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turn reinforce immigration trends since they perpetuate the expectations of immigrants. This
article examines the development of this parallel form of integration that has taken place at the
same time as the implementation of the trade agreement, beyond the control of the Mexican and
American governments. 
La  réduction  des  flux  d’immigration  n’a  jamais  été  un  objectif  officiel  de  l’Accord  de  Libre
Échange Nord Américain. Cependant, elle a souvent été envisagée comme une conséquence à
long  terme  de  sa  mise  en  place.  Quinze  ans  plus  tard,  l’immigration  vers  les  États-Unis  en
provenance du Mexique s’est en réalité accélérée. L’accord n’a pas pu réduire l’attractivité du
marché du travail américain pour les travailleurs mexicains et produire une alternative durable à
l’immigration. Au cours de la même période, les hommes politiques et les médias américains ont
adopté l’idée selon laquelle le contrôle de l’immigration serait devenu un problème de sécurité
nationale. Un paradoxe a émergé de ces deux tendances conflictuelles. Alors que les mesures
prises par le gouvernement fédéral n’ont pu prévenir l’afflux d’immigrés sans papiers, elles ont
en revanche accru la durée de séjour de ces derniers en accroissant les risques liés à la traversée
de  la  frontière.  Dès  lors,  les  années  1990  ont  connu  une  augmentation  significative  de  la
population sans papiers des États-Unis. 
Cet article analyse l’émergence d’un système régional d’intégration entre le Mexique et les États-
Unis, impulsé par les immigrés eux-mêmes, ainsi que par ceux qui profitent de l’immigration
irrégulière, plutôt que par les acteurs institutionnels. Cette intégration informelle est le produit
de deux types de mouvement : celui des migrants vers le nord de la frontière et, de plus en plus,
celui  de  leurs  transferts  de  fonds  vers  le  sud.  Ces  transferts  alimentent  à  leur  tour  les  flux
d’immigration,  puisqu’ils  perpétuent  les  attentes  des  immigrés.  Cet  article  examine  le
développement de cette forme parallèle d’intégration qui s’est déroulé au même moment que la
mise en place de l’accord de libre-échange, au-delà du contrôle des gouvernements mexicain et
américain.
La reducción de los  flujos  de inmigración nunca fue un objetivo oficial  del  Tratado de Libre
Comercio  de América del  Norte.  Sin embargo,  ha sido considerada,  muchas veces,  como una
consecuencia a largo plazo de la ejecución de dicho tratado. En realidad, quince años después, la
inmigración  desde  México  hacia  los  Estados  Unidos  ha  aumentado.  El  tratado  no  ha  podido
reducir el poder atractivo del mercado laboral norte americano en los trabajadores mejicanos ni
proponer tampoco una alternativa sostenible a la inmigración. Durante el mismo periodo, los
hombres políticos y los medios de comunicación norteamericanos adoptaron la idea según la cual
la inmigración se hubiera convertido en un problema de seguridad nacional. Una paradoja surgió
de  estas  dos  tendencias  conflictuales.  No  sólo  las  medidas  que  tomó  el  gobierno  federal  no
pudieron prevenir la afluencia de inmigrantes indocumentados, sino que también aumentaron a
la vez la duración de su estancia fuera del país y los riesgos de la travesía de la frontera. Por
consiguiente hubo, en los años 1990, un aumento significativo de la población indocumentada en
los Estados Unidos.
Este artículo analiza la emergencia de un sistema regional de integración informal entre México
y los Estados Unidos, movido por los mismos inmigrantes, así como por los que sacan provecho
de la inmigración irregular, y no por los protagonistas institucionales. Esta integración informal
es el resultado de dos tipos de movimientos: el de los migrantes hacia el norte de la frontera y,
cada vez  más,  el  de  las  remesas  hacia  el  sur.  Estas  remesas  alimentan también los  flujos  de
inmigración, puesto que perpetúan las expectativas de los inmigrantes.  Este artículo examina el
desarrollo de esta forma paralela de integración que apareció con la ejecución del tratado de
libre comercio, fuera del control de los gobiernos mexicano y norteamericano.
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